Subhash Dhuliya
At the dawn of the 1990s, the United States stood alone at the pinnacle of power. Thirty years later, that supremacy is fading. The liberal order it once championed is unraveling, challenged by the rise of China, India, and the Global South—and by the disruptive force of information giants and artificial intelligence. This article explores the decline of American dominance, the return of great power rivalry, and the uncertain new order being shaped by geopolitics, technology, and the rise of Asia.
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In 1991, the United States stood unrivaled. The Soviet Union had collapsed, China was still a developing country, and Europe looked to Washington for leadership. Francis Fukuyama famously proclaimed the “end of history,” declaring that liberal democracy had triumphed as the final form of government. The U.S. military footprint spanned the globe, global markets worked under American-designed rules, and U.S. culture dominated media and technology. The World Bank, IMF, and WTO were key players in advancing liberal democracy and free-market economics. Integration of national economies into the global economy—controlled by the West and dominated by the U.S.—seemed irreversible.
But only three decades later, the picture looks very different. The U.S. is deeply polarized at home, overstretched abroad, and challenged by rising powers. China, India, and the wider Global South are pressing for a rebalancing of power. At the same time, new technologies—artificial intelligence, digital platforms, surveillance systems—are reshaping how societies and states function.
“The post–Cold War liberal order was never permanent. It is dissolving, replaced by a multipolar and contested landscape.”
The liberal dream is virtually over, while right-wing nationalism sweeps across Europe and elsewhere, creating new kinds of disorder.
The Liberal International Order: An Anomaly?
The so-called liberal international order thrived only because the U.S. was powerful enough to enforce it. John Mearsheimer, the structural realist, calls it an anomaly. In an anarchic system, states prioritize survival, not ideals. Great powers seek regional dominance, which inevitably produces conflict.
The U.S. used its unipolar moment to spread democracy, expand NATO, and push globalization. But this was possible only because no rival could resist. Now, with China’s rise and Russia’s return, great power competition is back. Added to this is the fact that China, Russia, and even India are drawing closer together in the wake of U.S. tariff wars and strategic pressure.
The Ukraine war highlights Mearsheimer’s point. NATO expansion eastward—despite Russia’s warnings—provoked backlash. For Moscow, it was about security and spheres of influence, not liberal values. For Washington, it was about defending the “rules-based order.”
“The West kept asking: ‘Why do they hate us?’ The Muslim world replied: ‘Why do they kill us?’”
The result: war, sanctions, and polarization. European elites exaggerated the “Russian threat” to consolidate power, especially against the rising nationalist right. The U.S. itself turned inward with the MAGA movement, signaling its own shift away from liberal globalism.
American Overreach and the Erosion of Legitimacy
Economist Jeffrey Sachs highlights U.S. overreach: wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, unilateral interventions in Libya and Syria, and heavy use of sanctions. These actions eroded Washington’s credibility, pushing other powers toward greater autonomy.
Economically, U.S. dominance also suffered. The 2008 financial crisis shattered its prestige. Once the champion of free markets, America exposed itself as vulnerable to greed and mismanagement. By contrast, China’s state-led capitalism appeared more resilient. Sachs emphasizes that survival depends on cooperation—because climate change, pandemics, and inequality cannot be solved unilaterally.
Populist currents, from Trump’s “America First” to Biden’s industrial policies, reflect a retreat from globalization. The Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS Act protect domestic industries but spark friction with allies in Europe and Asia. Trump’s tariffs on allies accelerated the decline of U.S. influence, leaving a vacuum increasingly filled by China—even within Europe.
“The next world order will not be decided by armies alone, but by who controls information, algorithms, and platforms.”
Sharing Power in a Multipolar World
Charles Kupchan, in No One’s World, argues the U.S. must embrace restraint and accept multipolarity. The West no longer holds a monopoly on legitimacy or innovation. Asia, Africa, and Latin America are shaping the future. Washington should focus on domestic strength and prepare for a pluralist world.
Kishore Mahbubani, the Singaporean diplomat, frames Asia’s rise as a return to normal. For centuries, China and India accounted for the bulk of global GDP. The past 200 years of Western dominance were an exception. Now Asia is back, and the West must “share power gracefully” or risk instability.
The U.S.–China Trade War
The U.S.–China trade war reflects both Mearsheimer’s logic of power politics and Mahbubani’s thesis about Asia’s resurgence. Washington accused Beijing of unfair practices; China accused the U.S. of containment.
Despite tariffs, China doubled down on technological self-reliance: AI, semiconductors, and green energy. The U.S. can slow but not stop China. India and other countries have resisted U.S. pressure, asserting their independence.
Technology as the New Arena of Power
Power today is not only about geopolitics. Technology is shifting the foundations of power itself.
Mustafa Suleyman, in The Coming Wave, argues AI and synthetic biology could disrupt society like the Industrial Revolution. These technologies might empower humanity, but they could also destabilize it by fueling inequality and undermining state authority.
Yuval Noah Harari warns of the rise of “data-ocracy.” Whoever controls data and algorithms controls the future. Liberal democracy thrived on freedom, but algorithmic governance thrives on surveillance and prediction.
Shoshana Zuboff, in The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, exposes how Big Tech monetizes personal data, manipulating behavior. In China, state surveillance combines with AI to enforce political conformity.
“Information giants are no longer just companies; they are emerging as stateless powers, controlling flows of data much like empires once controlled trade routes.”
Companies like Google, Meta, Amazon, Tencent, and Alibaba act almost like new-age empires. They influence elections, social behavior, markets, and innovation—sometimes more than states themselves. The line between corporate and state power is blurring.
Regulating Artificial Intelligence
The global race to regulate AI reflects deeper geopolitical tensions. The EU’s AI Act focuses on ethics and rights. The U.S. hesitates, caught between innovation and regulation. China moves quickly, mainly to reinforce state control. Whether global cooperation emerges—or fragmented systems dominate—remains a central question of the century.
AI is also reshaping warfare and strategy. Whoever masters AI platforms could dominate not only economies but also military power and information flows.
India and the Strategic Middle
India embodies the contradictions of this new order. It partners with the U.S. in the Quad, yet maintains ties with Russia and deepens its role in BRICS, SEO and the G20. After facing high U.S. tariffs, India has moved closer to China. Modi’s recent visit to Beijing was called “very fruitful.” India seems to be following “multi-alignment” .
India’s digital infrastructure—Aadhaar, UPI, -transforms citizen access to services but raises privacy concerns in some quarters. Harari and Zuboff warn that such systems can empower citizens but also enable digital control.
Competing Futures: Rivalry, Cooperation, or Reinvention?
- Mearsheimer: U.S.–China rivalry is inevitable; instability likely.
- Sachs: Cooperation is essential for global survival.
- Kupchan: U.S. must adapt to multipolarity with restraint.
- Mahbubani: Asia’s rise is natural; the West must share power.
- Suleyman: Technology will be as destabilizing as geopolitics.
- Harari: Data and algorithms are the new battlefield.
- Zuboff: Surveillance capitalism threatens democracy.
“Will the U.S. and China fall into a new Cold War, or can the world reinvent globalization in more inclusive and sustainable ways?”
Conclusion: Between Decline and Reinvention
The decline of American power is not the end of global order—it is the beginning of a contested new chapter. Power is diffusing eastward and southward, while also flowing into new domains like data and AI. The world ahead will be defined not only by armies and GDP but by who controls information, platforms, and technological innovation.
The question is whether this transition produces conflict or reinvention. Will the U.S. and China fall into a Cold War, as Mearsheimer predicts? Or will a more inclusive order emerge, as Mahbubani and Sachs hope? Will humanity master its technologies, as Suleyman urges, or be mastered by them, as Harari and Zuboff warn?
The post–Cold War liberal order is over. The new world will not be unipolar or Western-led. It will be multipolar, technologically turbulent, and deeply uncertain. History is not ending—it is being rewritten
References
- John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001)
- Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Ages of Globalization (2020)
- Charles A. Kupchan, No One’s World (2012)
- Kishore Mahbubani, Has the West Lost It? (2018)
- Mustafa Suleyman, The Coming Wave (2023)
- Yuval Noah Harari, 21 Lessons for the 21st Century (2018)
- Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (2019)
Author
Subhash Dhuliya is a researcher, educator, and commentator on global affairs, with a focus on media, culture, and international communication. Founder-Director, Newswriters.in Former Vice Chancellor, Uttarakhand Open University Former Professor, IGNOU | IIMC | CURAJ
Photo by Maksim Shutov on Unsplash
